The Sources of Intentionality

Uriah Kriegel is Research Director at the Jean Nicod Institute (CNRS). His work centers on consciousness and intentionality. He is also the author of Subjective Consciousness: A Self-Representational Theory (2009) and Phenomenal Intentionality (2013), both from Oxford University Press.

• Contents ; Introduction ; 1. The Experiential Origins of Intentionality ; 1.1. The Concept of Intentionality and Anchoring Instances ; 1.1.1. An Anchoring-Instance Model of Natural Kind Concept Formation ; 1.1.2. Application to the Concept of Intentionality ; 1.2. Experiential Intentionality the Anchor ; 1.2.1. An Asymmetry of Ascription ; 1.2.2. Explaining the Asymmetry ; 1.2.3. Objections and Replies ; 1.3. 'Experiential Intentionality' ; 1.3.1. Definition ; 1.3.2. Existence ; 1.3.3. Scope ; 2. The Nature of Experiential Intentionality: I. A Higher-Order Tracking Theory ; 2.1. A Tracking Account of Experiential Intentionality? ; 2.1.1. Background: Tracking Theories of Mental Representation ; 2.1.2. Representationalist Theories of Conscious Experience ; 2.1.3. Experiential Tracking ; 2.2. The HOT Argument ; 2.2.1. Background: Higher-Order Theories of Conscious Experience ; 2.2.2. Higher-Order Theory and the Tracking Account of Experiential Intentionality ; 2.3. Experiential Intentionality and Higher-Order Tracking ; 2.4. Objections and Replies ; 2.4.1. 'Intentionality,' 'Representation,' 'Tracking' ; 2.4.2. What do We Want a Theory of Intentionality for? ; 3. The Nature of Experiential Intentionality: II. An Adverbial Theory ; 3.1. Background: Intentional Inexistence and Intentional Indifference ; 3.2. The Argument from Intentional Indifference ; 3.2.1. The Argument ; 3.2.2. Responses ; 3.2.3. Brains in Vats ; 3.3. The Argument from Intentional Inexistence ; 3.3.1. The Argument ; 3.3.2. Responses ; 3.4. Experiential Intentionality as Adverbial Modification ; 3.5. Objections to Adverbialism ; 4. The Nature of Non-Experiential Intentionality: An Interpretivist Theory ; 4.1. Potentialism ; 4.2. Inferentialism ; 4.3. Eliminativism ; 4.4. Interpretivism ; 4.4.1. Interpretivism about Non-Experiential Intentionality ; 4.4.2. Interpretivism Developed ; 4.4.3. Objections and Replies ; 5. Toward a General Theory of Intentionality ; 5.1. Adverbialism plus Interpretivism ; 5.2. Higher-Order Tracking Theory plus Interpretivism ; References

Kriegel has provided a rich and interesting proposal for integrating two traditionally opposed viewpoints on the nature of intentionality.