Active Cognition

This edited work draws ona range ofcontributed expertise totrace thefortune ofan Aristotelian thesis over different periods in thehistory ofphilosophy. It presents eight cases ofdirect or indirect challenges totheAristotelian passive account ofhuman cognition, taking thereader fromlate antiquity tothe 20th century. Chapters analyse the(often indirect) effect ofAristotle's account ofcognition onlater periods. In his influential De anima, Aristotle describes human cognition, both sensitive and intellectual, as thereception ofa form in thecognitive subject. Aristotle's account has been commonly interpreted as fundamentally passive - thecognitive subject is a passive actor upon which a cognitive process is acted bytheobject. However, atleast fromthetime ofAlexander ofAphrodisias onwards, this interpretationhas been challenged byauthors who posit a fundamental active aspect ofcognition. Readers will discover how one or more ofthree concerns - ontological superiority, direct realism and moral responsibility - drive theactive accounts ofcognition. Contributed chapters fromtop scholars examine how these three concerns lead thinkers totake issue withtheidea that cognition is a passive process. Theauthors consider Jesuit accounts ofcognition, Malebranche onjudgment, and Wittgenstein onperception, as well as Stumpf onactive cognition, among other relevant works. This book is ideally suited toscholars ofphilosophy, especially those withan interest in medieval epistemology, theinfluence ofAristotle, philosophy ofmind and theories ofcognition.