Air Power and the Defeat of a Warsaw Pact Offensive

The current US Air Force approach to air interdiction in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization


(NATO) is primarily attrition-oriented. This approach is flawed because of its requirement to


attack Warsaw Pact strengths, rather than exploit its weaknesses. This error is compounded by a


tendency to underestimate the inherent weaknesses of this approach. An examination of history


and Soviet doctrine and strategy indicates that air interdiction in NATO would be more effective


if the US Air Force used the tremendous potential of the family of air scatterable mines


(FASCM) to delay and disrupt a Warsaw Pact offensive. The use of FASCM would allow NATO


to attack directly weaknesses in Soviet doctrine and strategy. Intelligently integrated with the


maneuver of NATO land forces, air interdiction using FASCM could create powerful synergies.


Despite these potential advantages, there are several problems that must be overcome before the


US Air Force could make effective use of FASCM in a NATO air interdiction campaign. The


easiest problem to solve is the development and procurement of suitable FASCM. More difficult


problems are the shortage of personnel qualified to plan and control such an air interdiction


campaign and the lack of suitable air interdiction doctrine.