An Inconvenient Comparison

American experiences in the occupation of Germany can be used as key principles for conducting current and future occupation and reconstruction missions. The major problems the U.S. has encountered in Iraq--insurgency, press control, political disunity, economic and infrastructure challenges, political cleansing (i.e. De-Nazification/De-Ba'athification), military force levels and training, and command and control and interagency coordination (Defense vs State Department)--are the same dilemmas the U.S. had to plan, address, or solve for the occupation of Germany. By comparing and contrasting these two seemingly different operations (Germany and Iraq), we can explore what made Germany a success, how Iraq could have applied these lessons, and how this proves that there appear to be some common themes in occupation that can be applied to future operations. The results and recommendations of this paper conclude that despite the very different geopolitical circumstances between Iraq and Germany, a thorough study and adaptation of the lessons and issues confronting the American occupation of Germany could have positioned the U.S. for a higher chance for success in Iraq.