Artillery Battle

Currently NATO forces in Central Europe face a potential adversary who possesses a marked numerical superiority in artillery firepower. This fact is due in part to a political and military decision which tips our doctrine in favor of maneuver and technology. This monograph discusses the U.S. field artillery's approach to our doctrine and attempts to answer the question: Has the artillery to date succeeded in incorporating the potential, while avoiding the vulnerabilities, of recent technological developments that might defeat the Soviet artillery in the close battle? The monograph first surveys the history of Russian and Soviet artillery, specifically its reliance on massive amounts of firepower as an integral part of overall Soviet doctrine. Next, it examines the salient features of current Soviet doctrine and the U.S.'s approach to Soviet mass. Lastly, the monograph examines the field artillery's current technological thrust to determine whether new technology was grafted to the old doctrine or whether doctrine was modified to take advantage of technology. Finally, the monograph explores the doctrinal implications of employing recent technology. It concludes that doctrine is basically sound; however, steps should be taken to enhance the potential of the advances in light of Soviet attempts to counter them.