Bombs Away

Airpower has a significant influence within the American political process. Political debate over the application of airpower in limited conflicts involves when and how to use it, and whether it can be the sole means of military force. This monograph looks at limited conflicts in which the National Command Authorities decided to use airpower to produce specific results. It assesses the effectiveness of the application of airpower relative to the strategic political objectives of these conflicts. The monograph examines whether airpower contributed to creating a set of systemic conditions that compelled the enemy to concede. The application of airpower should have complimented the other instruments of national power. It should have been applied in accordance with the given strategic political environment. Specifically, as the military theorist Carl Von Clausewitz would have required, the means should have matched the ends. The monograph examines three limited conflicts in which airpower played a primary role. The first conflict is the Vietnam War, with the Rolling Thunder and Linebacker campaigns. The second conflict is El Dorado Canyon against Libya in 1986. The study concludes with the most recent conflict involving U.S. forces, Allied Force in Kosovo. The monograph centers on three primary questions relative to these conflicts: 1) Was the application of airpower in line with the identified military and political objectives in the conflict? 2) Did the airpower means match the ends? 3) What were the conditions that ultimately caused hostilities to cease, and what role did airpower play in creating those conditions? The monograph answers these questions by examining the political context, strategic and military objectives, and the stated U.S. policy in each conflict. It examines the nature of the conflict, the nature of the enemy, and the U.S. national interests at stake. It examines how risk assessment may have influenced decisions to use airpower. It also analyzes