Coercion and Land Power

OPERATION ALLIED FORCE has become a lightning rod sparking strong debate within the US military. The debate revolves around the subject of decisive military action and which branch of service most contributed to the successful campaign in Kosovo. Air power enthusiasts proclaim operations in Kosovo as further vindication of the supremacy of air power. Land power enthusiasts posit that it was the contribution of land power that delivered the decisive blow in Kosovo. Useful lessons learned are obscured by parochial diatribe. Anachronistic debate between the two polarized communities obscures insight into OPERATION ALLIED FORCE. Operations in Kosovo require a new perspective in which to examine actions and extract useful lessons learned. The best perspective for doing so is from the standpoint of coercion strategy. OPERATION ALLIED FORCE was a coercion campaign. During a coercion campaign, the military simply backs diplomacy with force. That force is measured and applied to achieve limited and quantifiable results. Coercion does not require decisive military force. The question that this monograph answers is does land power provide a relevant component in achieving goals and objectives during campaigns based on a strategy of coercion. An examination of OPERATION ALLIED FORCE from the perspective of coercion develops a deeper understanding of coercion strategy. It reveals empirical data from historical examples, explores coercion's role in US military doctrine, and reveals useful lessons learned while simultaneously discarding the dogmatic arguments of air and land power enthusiasts. The monograph concludes that land power is relevant in coercion campaigns. Success or failure of land power in one situation will not necessarily predict the same result in other situations. However, because coercion holds a pivotal role in United States foreign policy, the US Army should re-examine its role in a non-decisive sense in order to back diplomacy with limited power.