Coercive Warfare and Gradual Escalation

This monograph answers the question of whether operational air commanders have the necessary doctrinal tools to plan for effective airpower employment in gradually escalated, coercive warfare. It concludes that current Air Force doctrine does not adequately address coercive warfare. Given the question and answer, several secondary questions flow from them and are addressed in successive chapters. What do the terms gradual escalation and coercive warfare mean and how do they differ from rapid, decisive operations? Historically, how has airpower been employed in gradually escalated conflicts? What are the needed changes in current Air Force doctrine to address the planning and employment of airpower in a gradually escalated, coercive conflict? The main reason for the writing of this paper is to fill a gap in U.S. Air Force doctrine regarding coercive warfare. Accordingly, this monograph exclusively addresses U.S. Air Force doctrine and offers a doctrinal model for planning coercive air campaigns. It is beyond the scope of this paper to address Joint U.S. or NATO doctrine. The monograph uses two recent Balkan Air Campaigns, Operation Deliberate Force over Bosnia and Operation Allied Force over Kosovo, as historical examples of coercive conflicts. Both operations involved a gradual escalation of applied force to coerce the Serbians to accept NATO demands. In both cases and exclusively in Kosovo, airpower was the key component of this applied force.