Common Vision for the Common Defense

The current National Security Strategy is supposed to be the means by which the Nation expresses its fundamental national security goals, identifies national interests, and matches these interests with the necessary tools to implement the strategy on a daily basis around the world. However, the current national security strategy contains critical shortcomings. Its articulation of national objectives and interests is too broad to be truly meaningful. It prescribes a single strategy of Selective Engagement for the entire world, ignoring the possibility that that particular strategy may be appropriate for some regions but wholly counter-productive for others. In addition, by failing to link both means and ends in national security, this capstone document for American national security lacks one of the fundamental characteristics of a sound strategy. This monograph asks whether it is possible for the United States to develop a single grand strategy that articulates and prioritizes national interests in specific regions of the world, adopts a specific strategy to best meet those interests, and prioritizes the various tools available -- diplomatic, economic, and military -- to bring that strategy to life. The monograph includes a logical series of steps that might make it possible to design such a grand strategy: identifying key American interests, determining the proper time frame for the strategy, identifying the different regions of the world for the development of an accompanying regional sub-strategy, and finally matching these with the appropriate tools to carry each strategy through. The utility of designing such a strategy is measured against three specific criteria: feasibility, necessity, and desirability. The monograph concludes that creating a more comprehensive strategy is certainly feasible, very much necessary, and clearly desirable at this point in history. Thus, the author recommends that the architects of this new national security strategy set the cour