Conversation at the Club

This paper presents the author's views regarding the center of gravity, a concept which has created a surprising amount of disagreement among people studying operational art. The problem seems to stem from differences in interpretation of Carl von Clausewitz, from whose work the term "center of gravity" is derived. The principal point of contention is whether or not the term should be limited in application to military forces themselves, that is, to a concentration or mass of the enemy force, or whether it should be expanded to apply to a broad range of factors which affect war. Those who advocate an almost literal translation of Clausewitz's original word, schwerpunkt, argue that belligerents should seek a vital concentration of their enemy's armed forces and destroy it. The destruction of a major element of the enemy's combat power, they contend, will cause him to be unable to recover. He will have been unbalanced by the successful attack of his center of gravity. The U.S. Army's operations manual, FM 100-5, expands the concept of center of gravity beyond that encompassed by only the enemy forces. The manual states that at the operational and strategic levels of war, there are certain vital factors which can be attacked or manipulated in order to unhinge the enemy's effort, or at least to cause him to fight at a marked disadvantage. These vital factors, which are called centers of gravity, give balance and continuity to armed forces. The concept provides a planning tool whereby one looks at war as more than a simple clash of armies in the field, where the greater application of force is always decisive. Whichever way one interprets center of gravity, there is seldom dispute concerning its role in warfare. The determination of the enemy center of gravity and its effective attack are the essence of operational art, and represent the focus of strategic planners. "A Conversation at the Club" portrays a group of Army officers and their discussion of center of gravity.