Disjointed Combat Support in Joint Force Operations

Combat support operations at joint-use installations are disjointed.1 The current approach relies on the Services to provide combat support for their own forces on the installation despite similar and in many cases identical combat support requirements. Problems from lack of coordination, differing standards, and duplication of effort are prevalent throughout the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) area of responsibility (AOR). This paper will identify and discuss some of the problems with the current method of providing combat support at joint-use bases and will recommend the establishment of an installation Joint Task Force concept to improve the efficiency of combat support operations. Discussion begins with an overview of the challenges that stem from providing combat support and combat service support at joint-use bases. This paper relates to most if not all facets of combat support and combat service support (i.e. engineering, force protection, communications, food services, finance, chapel service, contracting, etc.). However, for the purpose of this study, research was limited primarily to engineering related topics and joint-use installations that supported Air Force and Army operations.