Dragooned into a Joint War

This study comprises an analysis of the evolution of joint operations in the Mediterranean Theatre of Operations during World War II. The author uses Operation Dragoon as a lens to evaluate the success of the evolution of joint and combined air-ground doctrine in the Mediterranean. The first chapter looks at American and British air strategy from the Battle of Britain to the end of Anzio in Italy. In this chapter, the reader will witness the evolution of American joint doctrine through the lens of airpower. The second chapter begins the focus on Operation Anvil/Dragoon by looking at the grand strategic battle over the fate of the invasion. The third chapter looks at joint operational planning in preparation for the invasion. This chapter draws on original source documents and concludes that the planning was far from perfect. Finally, the last chapter looks at Operation Dragoon from the tactical level through an analysis of the Battle of Montelimar. In this chapter, the reader will see significant problems in air-ground coordination even after three years of heavy fighting in the same theatre. The paper's conclusion is that although the Americans thoroughly evolved in their joint doctrine in the Mediterranean Theatre, in the end there were problems in both planning and executing the joint and combined fights that are still relevant today. The reader will see haunting echoes of the current debates about planning for Operation Anaconda and the Fire Support Coordination Line (FSCL) in Operation Desert Storm.