Examining the Capacity of the Philippine Army's Enlisted Corps to Accomplish the Government's Counterinsurgency Strategy

The Philippines faces a 39-year old communist insurgency. For years, it tried in vain to solve the problem by kinetic means. Deeply rooted in poverty, resolving this insurgency calls for non-kinetic approaches. This led to the creation of the Special Operations Team (SOT) concept which supports the Philippines' Strategy of Holistic Approach (SHA) which is comparable to the interagency process. A product of military innovation, SOT becomes the main COIN tool. The most salient point is the troops' immersion into communist-influenced communities to conduct wide-ranging activities designed to address people's grievances while achieving military objectives to dismantle enemy politico-military structure, set up counter organizations, and introduce developmental projects. The Army's enlisted corps is the backbone of the SOT program. The object of this study is to examine the capacity of this force based on the five critical areas of training, doctrine, leadership, resources and interagency support. It turns out that the enlisted corps is severely handicapped to accomplish the SOT mission due to substantial deficiencies based on each of the five criteria. To empower the enlisted force, the AFP must institutionalize SOT training, refine its COIN doctrine, re-educate its officer corps, boost SOT-intended resources and strengthen its interagency capability.