German Military Reform and European Security

This Adelphi Paper comprises three chapters devoted respectively to the context, content, and potential consequences of Bundeswehr reform. In brief, the argument of the book is that to understand the course and potential outcomes of German military reform it is essential to understand its context. The German 'starting point' on the road to reform is different from that of, say, the French. The Bundeswehr must overcome the prescription in its founding charter that it should be a non-interventionist, conscription-based territorial defence force. In trying to reform, Germans view it as essential to remain conscious of historically-based anxieties - which seem at times exaggerated to outsiders - about the danger of having a fully professional, interventionist military. Such worries arise from the unique historical role of Germany as the ultimate source of not one but two military conflagrations. The problem is not so much with the stated content of German military-reform plans. Germany has indeed come a long way from the Cold War 'culture of reticence. Rather, the problems lie in the reform's faulty execution (most importantly, the inadequate financing) and the conflicting priorities set for the process by German political leaders. Even as German policymakers say that the goal of reform is to increase Germany's effectiveness as an ally to its EU partners and to NATO, its ability to function as such is paradoxically undercut by a prioritisation of German domestic concerns.