Joint Cargo Aircraft

Delineating roles and missions of the US armed services has been a source of contention for most of America's military history, though it has grown more pronounced since the advent of the aircraft. While the current of debate ebbs and flows, today's nexus of tightening fiscal constraints, undeniable need for recapitalization, and the driving force of current operational requirement (drawn from Operations IRAQI and ENDURING FREEDOM, as well as, the broader Global War on Terrorism) highlights the importance of clear direction on roles and missions. One of the areas of concern is in the provision of airlift for joint forces. Operations in Afghanistan, and to a lesser degree in Iraq, highlight an airlift capability shortfall. In simple terms there is a gap between the dispersed locations of logistics-hungry forces in a non-contiguous battlespace and the nearest C-130 capable airfield. The Army and Air Force (AF) began individually ruminating ideas about an aircraft to fill that gap. After the services pursued separate acquisition efforts for several years, the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisitions, Kenneth Krieg, issued guidance on 20 December 05 directing them to form a joint program office merging the Army's Future Cargo Aircraft (FCA) program with the AF's Light Cargo Aircraft (LCA) program.