Leibniz on Compossibility and Possible Worlds

This volume brings together a number of original articles by leading Leibniz scholars to address the meaning and significance of Leibniz's notions ofcompossibility and possible worlds. In order to avoid the conclusion that everything that exists is necessary, or that allpossibles are actual, as Spinoza held, Leibniz argued that not all possible substances are compossible, that is, capable of coexisting. In Leibniz's view, thecompossibility relation divides all possible substances into disjoint sets, each of whichconstitutes a possible world, or a way that God might have created things. For Leibniz, then, it is thecompossibility relation that individuates possible worlds; and possible worlds form the objects of God's choice, from among which he chooses the best for creation. Thus the notions ofcompossibility and possible worlds are of majorsignificance for Leibniz's metaphysics, his theodicy, and, ultimately, for his ethics. Given the fact, however, that none ofthe approaches to understanding Leibniz's notions ofcompossibility and possible words suggested to date have gained universal acceptance, the goal of this book is to gather a body of new papers that explore ways of either refining previous interpretations in light of the objections that have been raised against them, or ways of framing new interpretations that will contribute to a fresh understanding of these key notions in Leibniz's thought.