Organic Army Unmanned Aircraft Systems

Although Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UASs) are proliferating in the joint operational environment at an astonishing rate, they are meeting only a fraction of the demand. The USAF's failure to meet this insatiable demand for armed intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) caused the Army to develop their own "organic" UAS capability. Does it make sense to spend $1.02B to create an aircraft capable of ranging the entire joint operations area, yet control it at the Army division level? This paper argues it is not in the best interest of the joint fight and it recommends alternative solutions for the Army's integration of "theater-capable" UASs. The research paper analyzes five contentious issues in a problem-solution format based on the USAF's MQ-1B Predator and the Army's planned MQ-1C Sky Warrior unmanned systems. The five issues include centralized versus organic control, rated pilots versus operators, airspace control methods, service interdependence, and deployment footprint. This research paper paints a picture of the current environment by looking at the situation from both the USAF and Army perspectives. This situation is not conducive to effective joint operations, and it will continue to deteriorate as the Army brings high altitude UASs online. This paper finds that the Army's decentralized, low altitude system composed primarily of rotary-wing assets historically coexisted underneath the Air Force's centrally controlled fixed-wing system. But the addition of more capable UASs, like Sky Warrior, brought the Army system up into the USAF system--where the two systems are no longer capable of providing an environment conducive to joint operations.