Putting the RSTA O & O to the Test

At the time of this writing, it is May 2001. A new, strategically responsive, medium weight unit from Fort Lewis, Washington, designated the Interim Brigade Combat Team (IBCT) is being formed and tested. The IBCT's organic intelligence architecture, the Brigade S2, a Military Intelligence (MI) Company, and the Reconnaissance, Surveillance and Target Acquisition (RSTA) Squadron, are also being formed and tested. The RSTA's unique cavalry-type reconnaissance and Military Intelligence collection capabilities are the focus of this study. The study is set in a fictitious Thailand - Burma smaller-scale contingency scenario in the year 2004 when the IBCT and RSTA are expected to be fully mission capable. At the request of the Thai government, the US National Command Authorities have authorized two Joint Task Forces (JTF) to the region to "support Thai sovereignty and conduct humanitarian assistance operations." The IBCT and its organic intelligence architecture are deployed to the area. The monograph specifically placed the RSTA squadron into a worst case scenario - one with competing humanitarian and possible combat operations, overshadowed by an uncertain threat to determine intelligence planning considerations. Intelligence contingency planners have little to assist them in planning for the employment of the new RSTA squadron. The uncertainty of the Thai-Burma situation required the study to consider: is the intelligence architecture supporting the IBCT capable of full-scale intelligence operations in this complex environment? The study calculated the capabilities of the intelligence architecture in a Smaller-Scale Contingency (SSC) Burma - Thailand scenario to determine how it can fully support complex operations. This monograph used elements of operational design (time, space, purpose, and resources) to specifically analyze and evaluate the capabilities and limitations of the IBCT's intelligence architecture. The snap-shot-in-time analysis highlighted operational-lev