Josh Weisberg is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Houston. He has published a range of articles in the philosophy of mind and is the author of Consciousness (2014).

• Part I. Consciousness: 1. Cognitive Phenomenology: Accessibility vs. Acquaintance Joseph Levine; 2. Two Kinds of Introspection Anna Giustina and Uriah Kriegel; 3. There's Something About David Martin Hahn and Kathleen Akins; 4. Thin Introspection Amy Kind; 5. Confidence Tracks Consciousness Jorge Morales and Hakwan Lau; Part II. Qualities: 6. Rosenthal on Mental Qualities Alex Byrne; 7. Rosenthal's Representationalism Jacob Berger and Richard Brown; 8. Quality Space Theory and Motoric Qualities Myrto Mylopoulos; 9. Qualitative Character and Conceivable Inversions Austen Clark; Part III. Higher-Order Thought: 10. A Challenge: Can Self-Monitoring be Achieved Without Consciousness? Daniel Dennett; 11. Being Self-Involved Without Thinking About it Miguel Angel Sebastian; 12. Higher-Order Thought Theory Meets Phenomenal Intentionality Sam Coleman; 13. Controlling phenomenology by being unaware of intentions Zoltan Dienes, Peter Lush, and Bence Palfi; 14. Mental Appearance and Mental Reality David Rosenthal.

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Josh Weisberg is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Houston. He has published a range of articles in the philosophy of mind and is the author of Consciousness (2014).

• Part I. Consciousness: 1. Cognitive Phenomenology: Accessibility vs. Acquaintance Joseph Levine; 2. Two Kinds of Introspection Anna Giustina and Uriah Kriegel; 3. There's Something About David Martin Hahn and Kathleen Akins; 4. Thin Introspection Amy Kind; 5. Confidence Tracks Consciousness Jorge Morales and Hakwan Lau; Part II. Qualities: 6. Rosenthal on Mental Qualities Alex Byrne; 7. Rosenthal's Representationalism Jacob Berger and Richard Brown; 8. Quality Space Theory and Motoric Qualities Myrto Mylopoulos; 9. Qualitative Character and Conceivable Inversions Austen Clark; Part III. Higher-Order Thought: 10. A Challenge: Can Self-Monitoring be Achieved Without Consciousness? Daniel Dennett; 11. Being Self-Involved Without Thinking About it Miguel Angel Sebastian; 12. Higher-Order Thought Theory Meets Phenomenal Intentionality Sam Coleman; 13. Controlling phenomenology by being unaware of intentions Zoltan Dienes, Peter Lush, and Bence Palfi; 14. Mental Appearance and Mental Reality David Rosenthal.

Select Guide Rating

Josh Weisberg is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Houston. He has published a range of articles in the philosophy of mind and is the author of Consciousness (2014).

• Part I. Consciousness: 1. Cognitive Phenomenology: Accessibility vs. Acquaintance Joseph Levine; 2. Two Kinds of Introspection Anna Giustina and Uriah Kriegel; 3. There's Something About David Martin Hahn and Kathleen Akins; 4. Thin Introspection Amy Kind; 5. Confidence Tracks Consciousness Jorge Morales and Hakwan Lau; Part II. Qualities: 6. Rosenthal on Mental Qualities Alex Byrne; 7. Rosenthal's Representationalism Jacob Berger and Richard Brown; 8. Quality Space Theory and Motoric Qualities Myrto Mylopoulos; 9. Qualitative Character and Conceivable Inversions Austen Clark; Part III. Higher-Order Thought: 10. A Challenge: Can Self-Monitoring be Achieved Without Consciousness? Daniel Dennett; 11. Being Self-Involved Without Thinking About it Miguel Angel Sebastian; 12. Higher-Order Thought Theory Meets Phenomenal Intentionality Sam Coleman; 13. Controlling phenomenology by being unaware of intentions Zoltan Dienes, Peter Lush, and Bence Palfi; 14. Mental Appearance and Mental Reality David Rosenthal.

Select Guide Rating