"Winning the War"

This monograph provides the context for a better understanding and appreciation of the difficulties U.S. military planners face in their labors to develop an effective plan to 18win the war. 18Winning the war 19 is not as simple as defeating an adversary, it also requires operations aimed at restoring the peace and societal reconstruction. The military cannot win a war by itself, yet the plans that it develops are the foundation from which the government pursues its objectives. Thus, it is imperative that military plans integrate and synchronize combat operations and postwar operations to achieve effectively the overall strategic objective. The monograph examines the development of plans for Operation JUST CAUSE, the 1989 military operation conducted Panama to remove Manuel Noriega from power; Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY, the 1994 military operation conducted in Haiti to restore the legitimately elected president, Jean Bertrand Aristide; and Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, the 2003 military operation conducted to remove Saddam Hussein from power and establish a democratic-like state. Additionally this monograph reviews joint doctrine to establish the concepts and frameworks in which military planners think about the use of force and develop war plans. The historical case studies reveal three trends in military planning that contribute to an overall ineffectiveness in planning to 18win 19. First, the plans developed for each of these operations were bifurcated; planners developed individual plans to address the use of force in combat (a high intensity environment) and to address post-hostilities operations (a low intensity environment). Second, coordination between all the government agencies responsible in some way for achieving the overall objective was ineffective or nonexistent. Third, classification and compartmentalization of planning efforts restricted the ability to assemble the required experts to develop a coordinated and integrated plan. The doctrinal review reve