Reassessing the British Way in Warfare

In the 1930s and 1940s, the military historian and strategic analyst Basil Liddell Hart developed the British 'Way in Warfare' thesis, which characterised British practice in warfare as a 'naval body' with two arms - one financial, expressed through trade, and the other military, comprising the deployment of combined army-naval operations. Though this theory has been the subject of much criticism, Reassessing the British Way in Warfare offers a much needed re-evaluation of its merits during the reigns of William and Anne. By examining the origins, progress and consequences of the Nine Years' War (1688-1697) and the War of the Spanish Succession (1702-1713), A.J. McLay provides us with the first detailed test of the historical credibility of Liddell Hart's thesis during the late 17th and 18th centuries. This analysis challenges traditional views of British warfare as slow, methodical, and comprised largely of manoeuvring armies and clashes between naval battlefields, showing a more nuanced understanding of the strategic and tactical principles underpinning British warfare during this period.