Reforming Domestic Intelligence

The terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 became a catalyst for significant reforms within the intelligence community. Those reforms have resulted in the creation of the National Counterterrorism Center, the designation of a Director of National Intelligence, and improved cooperation and collaboration on efforts to counter foreign terrorism efforts aimed at the United States. Reforms have not, however adequately addressed the domestic terrorism threat the United States faced long before September 11th and will continue to face in the future. The National Counterterrorism Center, which is charged with integrating all terrorism reporting and facilitating intelligence community collaboration, has no authority over purely domestic terrorism reporting (i.e., intelligence reporting collected inside of and pertaining to the United States). Consequently, the nation's most significant intelligence community reform can do nothing to overcome the gap between domestic intelligence agencies and law enforcement organizations. This paper will examine past and current domestic terrorism threats and analyze current limitations impacting domestic intelligence and law enforcement effectiveness in domestic counterterrorism efforts. It will use federal and local collaboration in Montgomery, Alabama as a case study of successful local efforts that could be refined for national application. The paper will also examine the achievements and potential applicability of the Compstat Paradigm - a management, collaboration, and technology system - to organizations engaged in domestic counterterrorism efforts. Finally, by applying Compstat Paradigm principles, it will recommend a new Domestic Terrorism Intelligence Center, to bridge the gap between domestic intelligence and local law enforcement counterterrorism efforts.