The Chinese Diaspora

This study argues that if the PRC cannot hope for a massive mobilization of its Southeast Asian diaspora, it has nevertheless the potential to turn a fringe of its diaspora into an effective instrument of power. On a broad scale, it shows that the potential for a massive mobilization of the Chinese diaspora by the PRC is nonexistent because more often than not only the host nations and the PRC see significant economic and stability advantages in the harnessing of its diaspora by the PRC. The majority within Chinese communities, however, have little incentive in cooperating with the PRC. Informed by history, the bulk of ethnic Chinese are wary of China's traditional -blood allegiance rhetoric and they probably do not want to take the risk of losing the benefits of their accomplishments by infuriating their host communities. If Beijing cannot expect to -levee-en-masse shadowy armies of ethnic Chinese to further its strategic interests, there is still the disturbing potential for the PRC to leverage the active cooperation of growing numbers of influential ethnic Chinese individuals, organizations, and communities. There are two main reasons that lead to this claim. First, the PRC's growing economic and military power allows it to better convince that it is genuinely concerned about protecting its blood overseas, therefore dampening the negative effect that pressure by hostile host communities has on the willingness of ethnic Chinese to openly cooperate with the PRC. Second, Beijing actively endeavors to build a worldwide network of influential individuals and organizations which already allows it to expand practices with which it is already familiar, such as: leveraging of powerful personages to influence the policy of foreign countries, enticing Overseas Chinese organizations to defend or actively further Beijing's political agenda, and appealing to them to voice their support of China's domestic and foreign policies.