The Ill-Made Alliance

While previous accounts suggest that Turkey entered into the alliance reluctantly, Millman contends that it not only wanted an alliance but sought as close a relationship as Britain would concede in the prewar years. He attributes the failure of the alliance mainly to Britain's lack of support, namely its inability to fit Turkey into its strategy in the Mediterranean, its failure to produce a coherent operational plan that could encompass Turkish military co-operation, and its unwillingness to provide Turkey with timely and much-needed financial, material, and industrial assistance. Divided into three parts, The Ill-Made Alliance examines the roots and course of the Anglo-Turkish rapprochement in the years 1934-38; the economic, military, and politic factors in 1938-39 that inhibited development of the emerging alliance to the point where it might have been fully functional; and the collapse of the alliance in 1939-40.