The Varieties of Self-Knowledge

This book explores the idea that self-knowledge comes in many varieties. We know ourselves through many different methods, depending on whether we attend to our propositional attitudes, our perceptions, sensations or emotions. Furthermore, sometimes what we call self-knowledge is not the result of any substantial cognitive achievement and the characteristic authority we grant to our psychological self-ascription is a conceptual necessity, redeemed by unravelling the structure of several interlocking concepts. This book critically assesses the main contemporary positions held on the epistemology of self-knowledge. These include robust epistemic accounts such as inner sense views and theory-theories; weak epistemic accounts such as transparency theories and rational internalism and externalism; as well as expressivist and constitutivist approaches. The author offers an innovative pluralist position on self-knowledge, emphasizing the complexity of the phenomenon and its resistance to any monistic treatment, to pose new and intriguing philosophical challenges.