War in the Falklands

This monograph analyzes the 1982 war between the United Kingdom and Argentina over possession of the Falklands in regard to several of the foundations of military theory. It uses this recent campaign which combines air, land, and sea forces armed with modern technologies as a case study of the applicability of traditional military theory to modern warfare. The monograph first reviews the general political background leading up to the outbreak of hostilities on 2 April 1982, then summarizes the salient military events of the war. Next it offers analyses of how politics and military action were interrelated throughout the campaign, how tactics, operations, and strategy interacted during the course of the war, and where the centers of gravity were situated for the opposing forces. It concludes with an overview as to the applicability, of traditional military theory to this particular campaign. The monograph concludes that the war in the Falklands was a unique opportunity to contrast two widely divergent approaches to warfare, one which paid heed to military theory and the doctrinal implications that stem from it and one which ignored many of its foundations. Although both belligerents were affected by the interactions of war and politics, one side effectively integrated all of its arms while the other allowed disparate actions to dissipate its efforts. Throughout the campaign the ultimate victor recognized the center of gravity of its opponent and attacked it, while the loser either failed to recognize that of its enemy or elected not to attack it. The indications are that the warring nation that understands military theory and its implications has a decisive advantage over an enemy that does not, even when the latter may have the more advantageous material position.