Kantian Moral Theory and the Destruction of the Self

This book defends Kantian moral theory against the claim that it damages the Kantian agent's integrity, self-development, and capacity to function well in personal relationships. . In Kantian Moral Theory and the Destruction of the Self , Sandra Fairbanks defends Kantian moral theory against the criticisms that allege adherence to Kantian morality damages, even destroys, an agent's personality and crushes his or her hopes of having satisfying personal relationships and attaining happiness. Fairbanks argues that there is no need to polarize value theory by relegating impartial theories to the realm of justice and impersonal relationships, and partial theories to the realm of care and personal relationships. Fairbanks develops a portrait of the morally good person, broadens our conception of duty, and recasts our view of impartiality as she argues that Kant's doctrine of duties to oneself actually enhances an agent's integrity and promotes positive personal relationships and the opportunity for happiness. In Kantian Moral Theory and the Destruction of the Self , Sandra Fairbanks defends Kantian moral theory against the criticisms that allege adherence to Kantian morality damages, even destroys, an agent's personality and crushes his or her hopes of having satisfying personal relationships and attaining happiness. Fairbanks argues that there is no need to polarize value theory by relegating impartial theories to the realm of justice and impersonal relationships, and partial theories to the realm of care and personal relationships. To make her claims, she develops a portrait of the morally good person, broadens our conception of duty, and recasts our view of impartiality as she argues that Kant's doctrine of duties to oneself actually enhances an agent's integrity and promotes positive personal relationships and the opportunity for happiness. Fairbanks addresses those formal doctrines of Kantian morality that allegedly sabotage an agent's attempt to develop a caring and well-integrated personality. She reviews the responses of prominent Kantians to these criticisms, and she provides new lines of defense that supplement those already offered in the literature. Fairbanks demonstrates that Kantian morality does not threaten a person's feelings of attachment, nor does it destroy personal relationships or one's sense of connectedness to others. She furthers her argument by saying that Kantian morality is not impersonal or out of touch with the concrete, relational, and historical context of a person's life. Kantian morality, Fairbanks believes, does not necessarily presuppose an abstract, isolated, ahistorical, or disembodied self.