Rules for Rebels

The Science of Victory in Militant History

Inbunden, Engelska, 2018

Av Max Abrahms, Northeastern University) Abrahms, Max (Professor of Political Science and Public Policy, Professor of Political Science and Public Policy

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Ever wonder why militant groups behave as they do? For instance, why did Al Qaeda attack the World Trade Center whereas the African National Congress tried to avoid civilian bloodshed? Why does Islamic State brag over social media about its gory attacks, while Hezbollah denies responsibility or even apologizes for its carnage?This book shows that militant group behaviour depends on the tactical intelligence of the leaders. The author has extensively studied the political plights of hundreds of militant groups throughout world history and reveals that successful militant leaders have followed three rules. These rules are based on original insights from the fields of political science, psychology, criminology, economics, management, marketing, communication, and sociology. It turns out thereâs a science to victory in militant history. But even rebels must follow rules.

Produktinformation

Utgivningsdatum2018-10-03
Mått164 x 242 x 25 mm
Vikt610 g
FormatInbunden
SpråkEngelska
Antal sidor298
FörlagOUP OXFORD
ISBN9780198811558

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Dr. Max Abrahms is among the worlds leading experts on the subject of terrorism. Currently, he is a professor of political science and public policy at Northeastern University. He has held various affiliations with the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University, the Empirical Studies of Conflict project at Princeton University and Stanford University, the Dickey Center for International Understanding at Dartmouth College, the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point Military Academy, the Council on Foreign Relations, the Center for Cyber and Homeland Security at George Washington University, the Center for the Study of Terrorism in Rome, the Moshe Dayan Center at Tel Aviv University, the economics department at Bar Ilan University, the political science department at Johns Hopkins University, and the Belfer Center at Harvard University.

Introduction: The Stupid TerroristRule #11. Learning to Win1: My West Bank Discovery2: Testing the Strategic Model of Terrorism3: Terrorism Success Stories Revisited4: Correspondence of Means and Ends Bias5: How Terrorism Expedites Organizational Demise6: What Smart Leaders KnowRule #22. Restraining to Win7: Principal-Agent Problems in Militant Groups8: Cultivating Task Cohesion9: The Structure of Success10: The Benefits of Centralizing11: When Elephants RampageRule #33. Branding to Win12: Denial of Organizational Involvement13: Denial of Principal IntentConclusion: The Future of Terrorism