The Matter of Consciousness

From the Knowledge Argument to Russellian Monism

Inbunden, Engelska, 2023

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Torin Alter presents a compelling defence of the 'knowledge argument' against physicalism, pioneered by Frank Jackson. According to physicalism, consciousness is a physical phenomenon. The knowledge argument stars Mary, who learns all objective, physical information through black-and-white media and yet acquires new information when she first sees colors for herself: information about what it is like to see in color. Based partly on that case, Jackson concludes that not all information is physical. Alter argues that the knowledge argument succeeds in refuting all standard versions of physicalism: versions on which consciousness is grounded by what objective science reveals. Alter also argues that given further, plausible assumptions, the knowledge argument leads to Russellian monism, according to which there are intrinsic properties that both constitute consciousness and underlie properties described by physics, such as mass and charge. Alter explains how the knowledge argument establishes those two conclusions and defend it against numerous objections.

Produktinformation

Utgivningsdatum2023-03-02
Mått162 x 240 x 23 mm
Vikt594 g
FormatInbunden
SpråkEngelska
Antal sidor280
FörlagOUP OXFORD
ISBN9780198840459

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Filosofiska discipliner inom Filosofi och religion

Torin Alter is Professor of Philosophy at The University of Alabama, USA. He is author of articles in Mind, Philosophical Studies, and elsewhere; co-author of A Dialogue on Consciousness and The God Dialogues: A Philosophical Journey (both OUP); and co-editor of Consciousness and the Mind-Body Problem: A Reader and Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism (both OUP).

Part I: The case for the epistemic gap 1: Introduction 2: The significance of structure 3: Structure, physical knowledge, and ignorance 4: Phenomenal knowledge without experience 5: Non-propositional phenomenal knowledge 6: Phenomenal representation Part II: The case for the modal gap 7: Deduction and necessity 8: Epistemic-modal bridge principles 9: The phenomenal concept strategy and Chalmers's dilemma 10: Consequences of social externalism 11: The conditional analysis of phenomenal concepts Part III: The case for the ontological gap 12: The supervenience requirement on physicalism 13: Two final objections 14: Two final objections 15: The knowledge argument, Russellian monism, and causal integration Conclusion

What can Mary know about the conscious experience of color from inside her black and white room, and what follows for the metaphysics of consciousness? Torin Alter gives a state-of-the-art analysis of these issues. He focuses especially on the crucial gap between structural and phenomenal aspects of reality, and articulates a powerful version of Russellian monism that traces this gap to a deep level of the physical world. Along the way he gives a definitive defense of anti-materialist arguments from objections old and new, shedding new light on this crucial nexus between consciousness, knowledge, and reality.