The Politics of Illusion and Empire

Western historians have traditionally depicted Germany's World War II policy on the Eastern front as simply a missed opportunity. According to this view, the Germans had only to take advantage of anti-Stalinist and anti-Bolshevik sentiment to insure a bloodless victory. The Politics of Illusion and Empire demonstrates that the German position was much more complex than is usually presented. This well-documented monograph centers on the critical nine month period from the autumn of 1942 to the summer of 1943. It examines the attitudes, efforts, and limitations of German civil and military officials during this time. The author describes foreign pressure for Eastern policy reform and the proposals for that reform. Mulligan also discusses agrarian reforms, German economic policies, and the crisis of the German anti-partisan effort, relating these efforts to Hitler's military strategy during this period. The conclusions point to the implausibility of the bloodless victory and support the revisionist approach to German economic and military policies of the time.