Toward a Common Cultural Bias

The overall intent of this monograph is to examine an operational warfighting headquarters (CFLCC) in order to show the degree to which its contemporary commanders and core planners exhibited a 18common cultural bias 19 or operational mindedness in their operational design for execution. In doing so, it suggests that not only does this 18common cultural bias 19 exist, but that future success in the US Army 's ability to design and execute operational warfare will continue to be a function of its ability to further develop this operational mindedness within the future officer corps. This paper should therefore provide the reader with in increased understanding and appreciation for the US Army 's ability to conduct operational art as a function of an operational consciousness, which manifests itself through commanders and planners who create operational designs in adherence to theoretically and historically informed doctrinal principles which are descriptive and not prescriptive. Such principles are inculcated through the service by means of education, training and practice in preparation for execution. The author 's hypothesis is that the US Army 's overwhelming success in the execution of OIF phase III Decisive Operations, was not a function of haphazard coincidence. Instead it was largely due to the existence of a developed 18common cultural bias 19 or operational mindedness, which was envisioned in the early 1980 's, and is now being manifested in real world operations like OIF.