Nachhaltige Vorstandsvergtung - Entwicklung und neue Anstze

Masterarbeit aus dem Jahr 2011 im Fachbereich BWL - Unternehmensführung, Management, Organisation, Note: 2, Fachhochschule des bfi Wien GmbH, Sprache: Deutsch, Abstract: Management remuneration has become a public and political issue over the lastyears of recession and one of the largest economic crisis all over the world. Sincedecades there are scandals of managers cheating in their balances or laying offthousands of employees to raise the price of the shares of their corporations toearn a high bonus. How much managers should be allowed to earn and how performancecontracts should look like is as well a controversial topic that on the onehand is more and more under public pressure and regulated by politicians, but onthe other hand not very well defined by law and corporate governance codices.This thesis describes the problem of moral hazard with the theoretical backgroundof the principal-agent-theory and in praxis and then tries to answer the question ifthere is any relationship of economic performance of a corporation and the remunerationof its managers. Later on systems and tools of fixed and variable remunerationwill be described with a focus on stock options and the ways how theycan set wrong incentives. After that it will be shown how these tools can be used ina sustainable way and how remuneration of managers could look like that providelong term incentives for them and lead to a sustainable economic performance.But not only economic sustainability will be discussed, but also social and ecologicalaspects of remuneration contract incentives will be a topic of this thesis.But after a lot of scientific background given in the thesis there will be a descriptionof some Austrian corporations that are listed on the stock market and how theirremuneration systems looks like and has changed over the last years. In thischapter theory will be put into practice and it will be shown how those tools are